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I

N HIS NOTABLE work, Evidence Law Adrift, Mirjan Damaška
identified three pillars of the common law system of determining facts
in adjudication, and examined these through a comparative lens: the
organisation of the trial court; the phenomenon of temporally compressed
trials; and a high degree of control by parties and their counsel. In
reviewing the book, I suggested that a strong concept of individual rights
was another critical feature of the common law system, especially in its
American variant and especially with respect to criminal defendants.1
In this essay, I will explore how these four features play out in the
Anglo-American and Continental system with respect to one right that has
been of particular interest to me, the right of a criminal defendant to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.
This right has long been one of the central aspects of the common-law
system of criminal jurisprudence. Nevertheless, for much of the last two
centuries the right has been swallowed up and nearly lost in the rule
against hearsay. Commentators have often regarded the hearsay rule,
which has no real counterpart outside the common law system, as a
product of the jury system, what Damaška calls the divided trial court. I
contend, however, that the hearsay rule reflected a broadening, and in
effect a dilution, of the confrontation right, which had been established
long before and was entirely independent of the jury system. The great
breadth of the hearsay rule was attributable to the increased role of
criminal defence lawyers, an aspect of the party control discussed in depth
by Damaška. But a rule so broad could not be maintained rigorously

* Many thanks to Christopher Miller, for very helpful research in unfamiliar
territory.
1
‘Anchors and Flotsam’, Book Review of M Damaška, Evidence Law Adrift (1998) 107
Yale Law Journal 1921.
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without yielding absurd results, and so the hearsay rule became relatively
porous. As a consequence, the meaning of the confrontation right was
virtually lost. Perhaps ironically, a basically sound conception of the right,
as a critical aspect of the law governing the procedure for witnesses giving
testimony, emerged in Continental Europe, under the European Convention on Human Rights, in dealing with systems unencumbered by a rule
against hearsay. More recently, the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Crawford v Washington2 has also established a basically sound
conception of the right under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Although I have described
both the European and American conceptions as basically sound, they are
substantially different from each other. As one might expect, the American
right is more categorical in nature. Also, two of Damaška’s pillars, party
control and the compressed nature of the common law trial, make salient
particular issues that are of less importance in the Continental system: who
produces the witness to testify and the timing of confrontation.
***
If an adjudicative system is to be rational, it must depend on the
testimony of witnesses. Once the Catholic Church withdrew its support of
the irrational ordeals as a method of proof in 1215, it became virtually
inevitable that the adjudicative systems of the western world would
develop procedures governing how witnesses would give testimony. The
courts of Continental Europe tended to take testimony in writing behind
closed doors, out of the presence of the parties, to prevent intimidation by
the parties.3 But the English courts took a different path. The presence of a
jury did not prescribe this path. Indeed, the English followed the course of
the ancient Hebrews4 and Romans,5 which did not rely on juries, and took
testimony out in the open, in the presence of the adverse party. In the 16th
century, Thomas Smith famously described the heart of a criminal trial as
an ‘altercation’ between accuser and accused.6 And for centuries, English
commentators and judges proclaimed the open, confrontational nature of
the English criminal trial as a key superiority of their system of criminal
adjudication over its Continental counterpart.7 This principle was emphasised in numerous treason statutes that required prosecution witnesses to
be brought ‘face to face’ with the accused. The practice of presenting the

2

541 US 36 (2004).
See RC Van Caenegem, ‘History of European Civil Procedure’ in M Cappelletti (ed) 16
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law 2, 77 (Boston, Mohr, 1973).
4
See Deuteronomy 17:6, 19:15–18.
5
See Acts 25:16.
6
T Smith, De Republica Anglorum (1583) M Dewar ed, (Cambridge, CUP, 1982) 114.
7
Eg, Case of the Union of the Realms, Moore (1604) (KB) 790, 798, 72 ER 908, 913,
per Popham CJ; S Emlen, Preface to State Trials (1730); M Hale, History of the Common
Law (c 1670) CM Gray ed, (Chicago, Chicago UP, 1971) 163–64.
3
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testimony of prosecution witnesses at trial, in the presence of the accused
and subject to adverse questioning, was not followed with perfect regularity, but it clearly was the norm well before 1700. The practice came to
America with the English settlers, and in an environment in which criminal
defence lawyers played a larger role than in England, it thrived. Indeed,
most of the early state constitutions established the practice as a right of
the accused; some of these used the time-honoured ‘face to face’ formula,
and others, drawing on Hale and Blackstone, used phrasing very similar to
that which was later incorporated in the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution in 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights.8 This is the Confrontation
Clause, which provides: ‘In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right … to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’
Notice that on its face the Clause governs how witnesses shall testify, for
testifying is what witnesses do, and indeed in many languages ‘testimony’
and ‘witness’ have the same root. The Clause does not speak in terms of
hearsay. It was not a constitutionalisation of the rule against hearsay, and it
could not very well have been, because though courts and commentators
had long spoken of such a rule in general terms it was still in an
amorphous and embryonic state when the Clause was adopted. During the
last two decades of the 18th century and the first few of the 19th, however,
the rule rapidly expanded, and elaborations of it became far more
sophisticated. Initially, the decisive force seems to have been the growing
role of criminal defence lawyers,9 though the doctrine soon kept pace on
the civil side. Believing fervently in the value of cross-examination, lawyers
did not limit their desire for it to adverse witnesses. Any time an
out-of-court statement was offered against them to prove that what the
statement asserted was true, they perceived the potential value of crossexamining the maker of the statement. And so the modern concept of
hearsay, ‘an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of a matter
asserted in it’, was first articulated.10 And indeed, the conception went
even beyond that. In the famous 1838 case of Wright v Tatham,11 the
scope of the hearsay rule reached its high water mark, extending not only
to assertions of a proposition but also to conduct that did not assert the
proposition at issue but appeared implicitly to reflect the actor’s belief in
that proposition.

8
See RD Friedman and B McCormack, ‘Dial-In Testimony’ (2002) 150 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 1171, 1207.
9
TP Gallanis, ‘The Rise of Modern Evidence Law’ (1999) 84 Iowa Law Review 499.
10
The following passage from 1 SM Phillipps, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence 7th edn
(London, Butterworth, 1829) 229 is not found in earlier editions (including the 6th edition of
1824): ‘Hearsay is not admitted in our courts of justice, as proof of the fact which is stated by
a third person’.
11
5 Cl & F 670, 7 ER 559, 47 Rev Rep 136 (HL 1838).
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A rule so extensive could not feasibly be enforced with rigour; it would
have caused the exclusion of too much evidence. Although beginning in the
early 19th century there has been a tendency to attribute the hearsay rule
to the presence of a jury, there is no persuasive reason to discern such a
connection.12 Indeed, there is no good basis for believing that as a
presumptive matter the introduction of hearsay evidence relevant to a
material proposition will lead a jury away from rather than closer to the
truth; on the contrary, it appears that the exclusionary rule, shutting the
eyes and ears of the trier of fact to evidence that is often highly probative,
impairs, slows, and adds unnecessary expense to the truth-determining
process.13 And so over most of the 19th and 20th centuries the trend was
to ease the rule against hearsay, by adding and broadening exemptions to it
and by establishing the power of the trial court to except individual
statements from it on a case-specific basis. This trend was fostered by the
dominant evidence scholar of the first part of the 20th century, John Henry
Wigmore. Lost in this development was a clear sense of the confrontation
right as a relatively narrow procedural principle governing the giving of
testimony by witnesses against an accused. But a flicker remained, keeping
alive some intuitive sense of the ancient right so central to our system.
In the homeland of the hearsay rule, the trend towards lenience went so
far, beginning with the Civil Evidence Act 1968, as to virtually eliminate
the hearsay rule in civil cases. The resulting dichotomy, a body of
traditional hearsay law in criminal cases but not in civil cases, has been
ascribed to another dichotomy, the presence of the jury in most English
criminal trials but not in civil litigation. As suggested above, however, I
find that explanation unpersuasive; I believe rather that Parliament has not
abolished the hearsay rule in criminal prosecutions because of some sense
that at the core of the rule is a valid principle central to the common law
system of criminal adjudication. And yet, because that principle is usually
not well understood or even articulated, Parliament has hacked away at
the rule in the criminal context as well in a manner seemingly designed to
shrivel the confrontation right. Thus, for example, Criminal Justice Act
1988 s 23 allowed several categories of statements made by an unavailable
declarant and embodied in a document, including a statement that ‘was
made to a police officer or some other person charged with the duty of
investigating offences or charging offenders’. It is hard to imagine a
provision better crafted to allow prosecution witnesses who might later

12
I have developed this point in R Friedman, ‘No Link: the Jury and the Origins of
Confrontation Right and the Hearsay Rule’ in JW Cairns and G Mcleod (eds), The Dearest
Birth Right of the People of England: The Jury in the History of the Common Law (Oxford,
Hart Publishing, 2002) 93.
13
See also R Friedman, ‘Thoughts from Across the Water on Hearsay and Confrontation’
[1998] Criminal Law Review 697, 700–01.
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become unavailable to give testimony in precisely the way that their
ancestors three and four centuries ago prided themselves would not be
allowed. And yet, Criminal Justice Act 2003 s 116 has since gone much
further, establishing what amounts to a general exception for first-hand
hearsay of statements made by a declarant deemed unavailable.
In the United States, the trend towards weakening the hearsay rule
reached a culmination of sorts with the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in 1975. The Rules narrowed the definition of hearsay, rejecting
the rule of Wright so that only assertions of a proposition could be deemed
hearsay; they chose broad versions of existing exceptions and incorporated
others that were not yet well established; and they explicitly authorised
courts to exempt statements from the exclusionary rule on the basis of
case-specific factors. Although the shape of some of the exemptions
appears to reflect an implicit sense of the confrontation right, the rules
draw rather little explicit distinction between criminal and civil cases, or
between statements that might be deemed to be the testimony of witnesses
and other hearsay.
And what of the expression of the confrontation right in the Sixth
Amendment? Until 1965, the Confrontation Clause could not matter very
much at all with respect to out-of-court statements. It was only applicable
to federal courts, and a court inclined to rule that admission of a given
statement would violate the Clause could easily find that admission would
violate ordinary hearsay law. But after the Supreme Court ruled that the
Clause was applicable against the states,14 the Clause had great potential
significance: although the Supreme Court, or any federal court acting on a
petition for habeas corpus, still lacked the authority to hold that a state
court had violated the state’s hearsay rule by admitting a statement against
an accused, it could hold that the same act had violated the Confrontation
Clause. The trouble, though, was that the confrontation right had become
so shrouded by the hearsay rule that the Supreme Court had no clear
conception of what it meant. After a decade and a half, the Court ventured
to articulate a general theory, under which the Clause was meant to sort
out reliable from unreliable hearsay: reliability could be inferred without
more if the statement in question fitted within a ‘firmly rooted’ hearsay
exception, and even if this condition were not met the Clause might be
satisfied if the statement were deemed to have sufficient ‘individualized
guarantees of trustworthiness’.15 This doctrine left the Confrontation
Clause almost completely limp, as little more than an easily evaded
constitutionalisation of the hearsay rule.

14
15

Pointer v Texas, 380 US 400 (1965).
Ohio v Roberts, 448 US 56 (1980).
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As the millennium closed, however, there were some encouraging signs,
because three justices of the Supreme Court indicated their willingness to
rethink the doctrine, and to recapture the original meaning behind the
Confrontation Clause.16 And then in the Crawford case came the great
transformation. Seven out of nine justices signed on to an opinion
discarding the old rubric. No longer could the Confrontation Clause be
satisfied by a judicial determination that the statement at issue was
reliable. Rather, the Court interpreted the Clause in accordance with its
clear language and its original meaning, as a procedural provision governing the method by which witnesses give their testimony. The Court
therefore detached the meaning of the Clause from the hearsay rule; the
focus of the Clause, the Court recognised, was not on all hearsay
statements but only on those characterised as testimonial, a category the
bounds of which it left undetermined for the time being.17 Within that
category, however, the Clause states a firm rule: a testimonial statement
cannot be introduced against an accused unless he has had an opportunity
to be confronted with and cross-examine the witness who made the
statement, and even if that condition is satisfied a testimonial statement
made out of court cannot be introduced against the accused unless the
witness is unavailable to testify in court. The Court explicitly indicated
that the accused could forfeit the confrontation right, by wrongful conduct
rendering the witness unavailable, and it suggested the possibility that
certain dying declarations might be admissible even absent an opportunity
for confrontation, as an historically justified sui generis exception to the
general rule, but these two qualifications, and in my view they are part of
the same one,18 were the only ones indicated by the Court.

16
White v Illinois, 502 US 346, 358 (1992) (Thomas J, with Scalia J, joining, concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment); Lilly v Virginia, 527 US 116, 140 (1999) (Breyer J,
concurring), 143 (Scalia J, concurring).
17
Crawford also left deliberately undecided whether the Confrontation Clause imposed
any strictures at all on non-testimonial statements. In Davis v Washington, 126 S Ct 2266
(2006), it answered that question in the negative. This is the proper answer, in my view. (For
a contrary perspective, see SJ Summers, ‘The Right to Confrontation After Crawford v
Washington: A Continental European Perspective’ (2004) 2 International Commentary on
Evidence, Issue 1, Art 3.) The confrontation right governs the manner in which prosecution
witnesses give testimony. If an out-of-court statement is not testimonial in nature, then,
though there may be other reasons why it should not be admitted, it is simply not within the
ambit of the confrontation right. At the same time, a sensible concept of the right depends on
its recognition that a statement is testimonial if made, no matter how informally or to whom,
in circumstances in which a reasonable declarant would anticipate a reasonable likelihood of
evidentiary or prosecutorial use. Failure to recognise this point would allow, and encourage,
testimony made informally or through private intermediaries but without an opportunity for
confrontation. See below n 25.
18
The traditional justification for the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule, that
no one would wish to meet his Maker with a lie on his lips, is unpersuasive. The better reason
for admitting some dying declarations is that the accused rendered the witness unavailable by
striking the blow that later killed her. I have explored this idea in various places, including a

Columns Design Ltd

/

Job: Jackson

/

Division: Chapter14

/Pg. Position: 6 /

Date: 19/8

JOBNAME: Jackson PAGE: 7 SESS: 29 OUTPUT: Fri Aug 29 11:26:47 2008

The Confrontation Right Across the Systemic Divide 267

Copyright © 2008. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. All rights reserved.

Among the questions left open by Crawford the most obvious, and one
that the Court has already begun to answer, in Davis v Washington,19 is
that of what testimonial means. But there are many others as well,
involving matters such as the adequacy of prior opportunities for crossexamination, the standards to be applied to child witnesses, and the
substantive and procedural principles governing the determination of
forfeiture.20 It will take decades for the Supreme Court to work out these
problems and develop a sound framework for the confrontation right. But
at least now it is on the right course.
Unfortunately, no other country in the common-law world has yet
followed the lead of the United States, though perhaps they will in time.
But, and here is what, in the grand historical sweep, appears to be a large
and delicious irony, in England, where the confrontation right was such a
point of pride for centuries, the courts and Parliament are now constrained
against ignoring the right altogether by doctrine issued by a court sitting in
France.21
***
Article 6, paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights
provides in general terms that litigants have a right to ‘a fair and public
hearing’ and paragraph 3(d) more specifically guarantees the right of a
criminal defendant ‘to examine or have examined witnesses against him’. I
will not attempt to discuss here why this latter provision was adopted,
what changes in national procedures its drafters contemplated it would
require,22 or why it lay virtually dormant for several decades. The key fact
is that since Unterpertinger v Austria,23 in which the European Court of
Human Rights first found a violation of the Convention because of the
lack of an opportunity for cross-examination,24 a steady trickle of cases

blog post entitled Forfeiture: The Standard of Proof and the Reflexive Case, http://
confrontation right.blogspot.com/2007/08/standard-of-review-for-limitations-on.html (July
20, 2007).
19
126 S Ct 2266 (2006).
20
I have laid out some of the pending issues in a blog post, Pending Crawford Issues,
http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2006/11/pending-crawford-issues.html (12 November
2006), and in Crawford, Davis, and Way Beyond, 15 JL & Policy 551 (2007).
21
See C Tapper, Cross and Tapper on Evidence 11th edn (London, Butterworths, 2007)
645, 664–6. The tendency of courts in the United Kingdom appears to be to interpret the
national statutes stringently enough and the Convention leniently enough that the two do not
conflict. See B Emmerson, A Ashworth and A Macdonald, Human Rights and Criminal
Justice 2nd edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2007) 643–53.
22
Continental procedures are very diverse, a point emphasised in Summers, above n 17.
While confrontations between accused and prosecution witnesses have been ‘not uncommon’
in some Continental systems, it is also clear that the Convention has had a significant impact
in requiring confrontation. Ibid 2.
23
Series A, No 110, App No 9120/80 (ECHR 1986), (1991) 13 EHRR 175.
24
See M Holdgaard, ‘The Right to Cross-Examine Witnesses: Case Law under the
European Convention on Human Rights’ (2002) 71 Nordic Journal of International Law 83,
83 n1.
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emanating from Strasbourg has addressed the question of the circumstances in which an accused must have an opportunity to be confronted
with the prosecution witnesses. Several points about this body of law,
especially in comparison to its American counterpart, are significant here.
First, this is clearly a doctrine governing the procedure under which
prosecution witnesses give testimony, pure and simple. To be effective, a
right meant to ensure that witnesses testify in proper judicial proceedings
must reach witnesses who effectively testify outside such proceedings; the
European Court has not had difficulty recognizing this idea.25 The doctrine
developed by the Court is one of confrontation, and the Court has referred
to it as such.26 It does not purport to create a rule against hearsay, and the
Court’s discussion does not refer to that rule or to any doctrines from the
common law countries. Indeed, it seems probable that the absence of any
controlling hearsay rule left the landscape uncluttered and made it easier
for the Convention and the Court to articulate a straightforward doctrine
on the examination of witnesses. And so, though it is ironic it may not be
surprising that the European Court began establishing this doctrine nearly
two decades before Crawford and while law reformers in England and
other parts of the common law world were dismantling the hearsay rule
with little heed for the confrontation principle.
Second, the European Court perceives a ‘principle of equality of arms
inherent in the concept of a fair trial and exemplified in paragraph 3(d)’;27
similarly, the Court has said that Articles 6(1) and 6(3)(d) are ‘aimed at
securing equality between the defence and the prosecution in criminal
proceedings’.28 Although some American observers talk about a ‘level
playing field’, the savvier ones recognise that this is a myth in criminal
procedure:29 the prosecution has some advantages, the defence has others,
and the two sets are not commensurable. Equality is not a significant part
of the rhetoric of the confrontation right in the common law system. The
confrontation right is much older than the right to call witnesses in one’s

25
Eg, Mild and Virtanen v Finland, App Nos. 39481/98, 40227/98 (ECHR 26 Jul 2005).
Summers, above n 17, 8–9, suggests that the European right is construed more broadly than
the American right in one important respect. Statements to a doctor describing criminal
activity, such as a statement by a child describing sexual abuse, are considered nontestimonial by some American courts, but Summers contends that they would be within the
purview of the Convention. In my view, a statement describing a crime made to a doctor
should ordinarily be considered testimonial as fully as if the statement were made to the
police, because in all probability the doctor will act as a conduit to the criminal justice system.
26
See Saïdi v France, App No 14647/89, [1994] 17 EHRR 251 (ECHR 1993) (‘The lack
of any confrontation deprived him in certain respects of a fair trial.’)
27
Bonisch v Austria, Series A, No 92, App No 8658/79, [1987] 9 EHRR 191 (ECHR
1985).
28
Asch v Austria, Series A, No 203-A, App No 12398/86, [1993] 15 EHRR 597 (ECHR
1991).
29
See HR Uviller, The Tilted Playing Field: Is Criminal Justice Unfair? (New Haven, Yale
UP, 1999).
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defence, which even now many defendants do not invoke. The confrontation right is based not on a concept of equality between prosecution and
defence but rather on a deep-seated belief that an essential condition to
make prosecution testimony acceptable is that the accused have a chance
to confront and examine the witness.
Third, as suggested by the passages quoted in the last paragraph, the
European Court regards the confrontation right developed under Article
6(3)(d) of the Convention as an instantiation of the general right to a fair
trial under Article 6(1), and in a weak sense; that is, the overall question is
whether the accused has had a fair trial, and a denial of confrontation is a
factor to be taken into account in making that assessment.30 By contrast,
under Crawford, as discussed above, the right is categorical: if a statement
is testimonial in nature, then (putting aside the possibility of forfeiture and
the case of dying declarations) it cannot be admitted against an accused
unless he has had an opportunity to cross-examine and the witness is
unavailable. To be sure, American appellate courts will not reverse a
conviction on the basis of a confrontation violation if they deem the error
to be harmless, and they are often rather aggressive in so deeming. But the
harmless-error doctrine does not avoid the fact of a violation, and it can
only be invoked by an appellate court. An American court could not
legitimately say, ‘It is unclear whether admitting this statement, which is
testimonial in nature and as to which the accused has not had confrontation, would alter the outcome of the trial, but overall the defendant has
had a fair trial, so there is no violation’.
The fuzzier nature of the European right manifests itself in various
ways.31 One is that in some circumstances unavailability of the witness
through the fault of neither party is deemed enough to excuse the absence
of an opportunity for confrontation;32 by contrast, under Crawford, only if
the witness’s unavailability was caused by the wrongful conduct of the
accused (and, under the recent case of Giles v California33, only if the
conduct was designed to have that effect) can it excuse the absence of an
opportunity for cross-examination. Another manifestation is that the
European right is less likely than its American counterpart to be deemed
violated if the witness in question does not appear to be central to the
case.34

30

See Holdgaard, above n 24, 85.
Summers, above n 17, complains about insufficiently predictable ‘judicial self regulation’ under the decisions by the Strasbourg Court.
32
Eg, Gossa v Poland, App No 47986/99 (ECHR 9 Jan 2007).
33
126 S Ct 2678 (2008).
34
Eg, Trivedi v UK, App No 31700/96, [1997] EHRLR.521 (Eur Comm Human Rts
1997) ‘The Commission … emphasised that Mr C’s statements were not the only evidence in
the case to show [a critical fact].’).
31
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Fourth, because of the difference between common law and Continental
systems in the role of the parties in the litigation, one of the key features
stressed by Damaška, it may possibly be appropriate for the systems to
adopt different attitudes towards rules allowing defendants to call witnesses to testify at trial. Under Crawford, if the prosecution does not
provide an opportunity for confrontation, it should not be a sufficient
answer that the accused could have called the witness to the stand
himself.35 An accused who puts on the stand a hostile witness whose
statement has already been admitted against him runs a great risk that he
will have little or nothing to show for the effort, in which case the move
will almost certainly backfire. The risk is indeed so great that defence
counsel virtually never do it, though if the prosecution were to put the
same witness on the stand defence counsel would almost certainly ask at
least a few questions on cross-examination. The opportunity to call the
witness to testify, therefore, should not be regarded as an adequate
substitute for the opportunity to cross-examine a prosecution witness. By
contrast, in the Continental system, in which there is much less association
of parties with witnesses and much less structuring and party control of
questioning, perhaps it is acceptable to provide that the witness will not be
brought to trial unless the accused takes the initiative to produce her.36
Similarly, another of the pillars emphasised by Damaška, the compressed
nature of the common law trial, makes salient in the common law system
another issue that may be less important in the Continental system, the
timing of the opportunity for confrontation. Under California v Green,37 a
pre-Crawford decision that is presumably still good law in this respect, an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness at a preliminary hearing satisfies
the confrontation right if the witness is unavailable to testify at trial.38
That is an unfortunate result, I believe, because the functions of the
preliminary hearing and of the trial are so distinct that, even though the
accused formally has an opportunity to pose questions at the hearing,
hardly ever does defence counsel engage in a complete cross-examination;
indeed, if counsel tried to do so, the judge would probably put a short stop

35
See, eg, Thomas v US 914 A 2d 1 (DC 2006), and my blog posts Pending Cert
Petitions, <http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2007/01/pending-cert-petitions.html> (3
January 2007) accessed 18 June 2008; Shifting the Burden, Take 2, http://confrontationright.
blogspot.com/2006/08/shifting- burden-take-2.html (2 August 2006); and Shifting the Burden, http://confrontationright.blogspot. com/2005/03/shifting-burden.html (16 March 2005).
Some cases have, however, taken the contrary view, eg, State v Campbell, 719 NW 2d 374
(ND 2006), cert denied, 127 S Ct 1150 (2007).
36
Note the cases discussed in Holdgaard, above n 24, 103.
37
399 US 149 (1970).
38
Crawford explicitly reaffirmed another aspect of Green, that the confrontation right is
not violated by introducing an earlier statement if the witness testifies at trial, even if the
witness’s direct testimony is inconsistent with the prior statement. I believe both these aspects
of Green are ill-considered.
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to the exercise.39 But if one regards the Continental system as creating a
less sharp functional distinction between steps in the process, then arguably it is more justifiable to hold, as the European Court does, that an
opportunity for examination at a preliminary hearing satisfies the confrontation right.40
***
The American and Continental traditions are very different, not only in
the institutional respects emphasised by Damaška but also in their constitutional styles, and particularly in their treatment of individual rights. For
this reason, I doubt that within the foreseeable future the contours of the
confrontation right as developed in the two systems will become much
closer than they are now; the categorical American right will presumably
remain stronger than its European counterpart.
The interesting question is what will happen in the United Kingdom. It is
there that the confrontation right first flourished and reached maturity, and
there that for centuries the right was a particular matter of pride. But the
rule against hearsay subsumed the right, and eventually became so broad
that inevitably it, along with the right, was greatly diluted; as a result the
right was little understood and nearly forgotten. In the United States, the
text of the Confrontation Clause provided a reminder of the nature of the
right, and ultimately its mandate caused a historically minded Supreme
Court to give the right new life in accordance with its historical meaning.
In the United Kingdom there is no comparable text, and the only operative
mandate comes from the European Convention and the cases construing it.
The path of least resistance would be to obey the commands of that
jurisprudence and do nothing more. But perhaps Crawford, by effecting a
virtual rediscovery of the confrontation right in the former colonies, will
eventually lead to a similar phenomenon in the mother country as well.

39
In a blog post titled Opportunity for Cross-Examination at Preliminary Proceedings,
http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2007/08/opportunity-for-cross-examination-at.html
(29 August 2007), I posed the question of how often counsel engaged in complete
cross-examination at preliminary hearings. The responses suggest that they hardly ever do so
and that sophisticated defence counsel avoid later problems by confirming that the judge
would not allow them to.
40
Eg, Vozhigov v Russia, App No 5953/02 (ECHR 26 Apr 2007). See also, eg, Delta v
France, Series A, No 191-A, App No 11444/85, [1993] 16 EHHR 574 (ECHR 1990) (accused
should have an ‘adequate and proper opportunity’ for confrontation ‘either at the time the
witness makes his statement or at some later stage of the proceedings’).
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